证券准入监管与会计政策选择——来自IPO公司研发支出资本化的证据  

Securities Regulation of Entry and Accounting Policy Choice——Evidence from R&D Capitalization

作　　者：辛清泉[1,2,3] 李瑞涛 夏立军 Xin Qingquan

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院/会计治理与公司财务创新研究院,400030 [2]西南政法大学商学院,401120 [3]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,200030

出　　处：《会计研究》2021年第9期48-64,共17页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872022、72072115);重点项目(72132006);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(CDJSK100209、2017CDJSK02PT25);财政部“会计名家培养工程”对本文的资助。

摘　　要：基于中国证券市场准入监管的制度背景,本文对IPO公司研发支出的会计政策选择进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究发现,IPO公司在上市之前研发支出资本化程度要显著低于上市之后。并且,在IPO审核监管更为严格的期间,IPO公司进一步降低了研发支出资本化的概率。研究还发现,上市前会计业绩更差的公司,在IPO审核阶段更可能对研发支出进行资本化,但这些公司在招股说明书中会对研发支出进行更充分的信息披露。本研究为证券准入监管如何塑造公司的会计政策选择和信息披露提供了新的视角和新的证据。In a setting of securities regulation of entry in China’s IPO market, this paper demonstrates the role that regulatory approval play in determining the capitalization of development costs of 825 IPO companies.We document that IPO companies are less likely to capitalize their R&D investment before going public.Moreover, during the period of stricter regulation of entry, IPO companies further reduce the probability of R&D capitalization.We also show that IPO companies with worse pre-IPO accounting performance are more likely to capitalize their R&D investment before going public.However, these IPO firms provide fuller voluntary disclosures of R&D investment in the IPO prospectus.Our results should help in understanding how regulation shapes a company’s accounting choices and voluntary disclosures.

关 键 词：准入监管 研发支出资本化 会计政策选择 自愿披露 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F273.1