新时代食品安全治理博弈研究  

Research on Food Safety Governance Gaming in the New Era

作　　者：马蓓蕾[1] 赵海霞[2] MA Bei-lei;ZHO Hai-xia(School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Technology, Huainan Anhui 232001, China;School of Earth and Environment, Anhui University of Technology, Huainan Anhui 232001, China)

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001 [2]安徽理工大学地球与环境学院,安徽淮南232001

出　　处：《湖北第二师范学院学报》2021年第12期47-50,共4页Journal of Hubei University of Education

基　　金：2015年度安徽省哲学社会科学规划基金(AHSKQ2015D47);2016年度安徽省高校人文社科重点项目(SK2016A0299)。

摘　　要：基于食品安全监管者与食品供应商之间的博弈效用矩阵,食品安全问题的有效治理与监管覆盖面和监管力度息息相关,食品安全监管是监管者与供应商“相机决策”的动态博弈解。监管者的监管力度受监管成本、监管技术等因素影响;食品生产商的机会主义行为与受处罚力度息息相关,考虑各自的监管成本和监管收益,监管者具有不监管或消极监管的动机。在加大惩罚力度、扩展监管覆盖范围、提升检测技术水平的基础上构建以法治化为中心、信息传递为重心,伦理责任为核心的社会治理机制不失为一组有效的改善当前食品安全境况的“政策组合”。Based on the game utility matrix between food safety regulators and food suppliers,the effective governance of food safety is closely related to the coverage and intensity of supervision.Food safety supervision is the dynamic game of“contingent decision”between regulators and suppliers.Supervisors are influenced by factors such as the cost and technology of supervision.Food suppliers’risky behaviors are closely related to the seriousness of punishment.Considering the cost and reward,supervisors have the motive of not supervising or negative supervision.So,on the basis of increasing punishment,expanding the scope of supervision and improving detection technology,the construction of a social governance mechanism with the rule of law as the center,information transmission as the focus,and ethical responsibility as the core can be effective policy combinations to improve the current food safety situation.

关 键 词：新常态 食品安全 信息不对称 博弈 

分 类 号：D669[政治法律—政治学]