管理层、非控股股东抱团调研博弈均衡分析  

Game Equilibrium Analysis between Management Layer and Non-controlling shareholders’Collective Site Visit

作　　者：张敬钦 叶勇 ZHANG Jing-qin;YE Yong(School of Finance and Economics,Henan Polytechnic University,Jiaozuo Henan 454000,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu Sichuan 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]河南理工大学财经学院,河南焦作454000 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2022年第1期49-54,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：非控股股东作为上市公司的持股者之一,为了维护自身利益不被管理层和控股股东侵害,通常会主动对上市公司进行调研来获取相关信息。但是,并不是所有的股东参与行为都会得到管理层的重视,因此非控股股东需要通过抱团调研提高与管理层沟通时的话语权,来保证自身的权益得到有效保护。文章运用前景价值函数构建了非控股股东及管理层对收益及损失的感知价值并通过演化博弈建模进行比较静态分析,刻画了更加贴近现实的参与者认知决策。研究表明,非控股股东的边际收益敏感度/风险敏感度、损失的预计期望、管理层对于利己行为的预期收益等因素会明显影响到非控股股东的抱团调研行为。文章最后给出相关建议,为非控股股东、公司和政府提供相关决策参考。As one of the shareholders of listed companies,non-controlling shareholders usually take the site visit on the listed companies to obtain relevant information in order to protect their own interests from being infringed by the management and controlling shareholders.However,not all shareholders’behavior will be valued by the management.Therefore,non-controlling shareholders need to improve their voice in communication with the management through group behavior to ensure that their rights and interests are effectively protected.This paper uses the prospect value function to construct the perceived value of non-controlling shareholders and management on income and loss,and makes a comparative static analysis through evolutionary game modeling to describe the participants’cognitive decision-making closer to reality.The research conclusion shows that the marginal income sensitivity or risk sensitivity of non-controlling shareholders,the expected expectation of loss and the expected income of management for self-interest behavior will significantly affect the collective site visit of non-controlling shareholders.Finally,the paper gives relevant suggestions to provide relevant decision-making reference for non-controlling shareholders,companies and governments.

关 键 词：非控股股东 抱团调研 管理层利己行为 感知价值 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]