独立董事薪酬与大股东掏空:激励还是合谋  

Independent Director Compensation and Tunneling of Major Shareholders:Incentive or Collusion

作　　者：卢太平[1] 马腾飞[1] LU TaiPing;MA TengFei(Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《财贸研究》2021年第12期94-105,共12页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“数字经济领域反垄断对企业创新的影响机制与效应研究”(21BGL120)。

摘　　要：以2006—2019年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验独立董事薪酬对大股东掏空的影响。研究发现,较高的薪酬会削弱独立董事的独立性,并加剧大股东掏空程度,支持“合谋”观点。作用机制检验发现,提高独立董事薪酬会降低企业会计信息质量,促使独立董事积极参会并减少其异议行为,最终加剧大股东“掏空”程度。Taking the A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2019 as research samples,this paper empirically examines the influence of independent director compensation(IDC)on the tunneling of major shareholders.This paper finds that higher compensation will weaken the independence of independent directors and increase the degree of tunneling by major shareholders,which supports the existing view of“collusion”.Further results show that improving IDC will reduce the quality of accounting information,encourage independent directors to attend the meeting actively and reduce their dissenting behaviors,and ultimately increase the tunneling degree of major shareholders.

关 键 词：独立董事薪酬 大股东掏空 激励假说 合谋假说 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]