基于演化博弈的企业知识产权侵权治理制度研究  

Research on the Governance System of Enterprise Intellectual Property Infringement Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：陈小燕 张峥[1] CHEN Xiao-yan;ZHANG Zheng(School of Management,Shanghai University for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《经济研究导刊》2022年第2期151-155,共5页Economic Research Guide

摘　　要：通过构建潜在侵权企业和政府监管部门关于知识产权保护与侵权的演化博弈模型,分析双方主体策略选择的演化路径与均衡,并在此基础上结合制度工程学的理论与方法探究治理制度有效性的参数边界条件。结果发现,当参数范围同时满足政府监管成本小于其监管所获正向收益之和、企业侵权所获不良收益小于其侵权应承担的负面损失之和这两个条件时,博弈系统将会演化至政府监管、企业不侵权的理想稳定状态;这时通过对政府观测力度、惩罚力度、不良收益的组合控制,可以使治理制度达到理想目标。This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of intellectual property protection and infringement between potential infringing enterprises and government regulatory departments,analyzes the evolutionary path and equilibrium of both sides’main strategy choice,and on this basis,combined with the theory and method of institutional engineering,explores the parameter boundary conditions of governance system effectiveness.The results show that the game system will evolve to an ideal stable state of government supervision and enterprise non infringement when the parameter range meets the two conditions that the cost of government supervision is less than the sum of positive benefits and the bad benefits of enterprise infringement is less than the sum of negative losses.Through the combination control of government observation,punishment and bad income,the governance system can achieve the ideal goal.

关 键 词：演化博弈 制度工程学 知识产权侵权 政府监管 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]