回购契约下损失厌恶的零售商订货策略及供应链协调  

The Ordering Strategy and Supply Chain Coordination of Loss-averse Retailers under Buyback Contract

作　　者：彭承琪 PENG Cheng-qi(Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学,山东青岛266061

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2022年第1期79-82,共4页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：文中以一个风险中性供应商以及一个具有融资需求且损失规避零售商组成的两阶段供应链为研究对象。首先运用多重心理账户将销售收入以及失售成本分离为2个账户,分别研究在集中决策、无契约下分散决策以及采取回购契约三种情形下零售商的最优订购策略以及其与相关参数之间的关系;其次,通过调整回购价格契约使供应链达到协调,并计算出回购价格的取值范围;最后,通过算例分析进一步论证。研究表明:采用多重心理账户计算会更加简便且易获得解析解,此外,损失规避假设下采用回购契约仍然能够达到供应链协调,并且回购价格与损失厌恶及批发价成正比。Taking a two-stage supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a loss-averse retailer with financing demand as the research object. This article first uses multiple mental accounts to separate the sales revenue and the cost of loss of sale into two accounts,and studies the retailer’s optimal ordering strategy and related parameters in the three situations of centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making without contract and buyback contract. Secondly,the supply chain is coordinated by adjusting the buyback price contract,and the value range of the buyback price is calculated. Finally,it is further demonstrated through the analysis of calculation examples. The results show that the use of multiple mental account calculations will be more simple which is easier to obtain analytical solutions. In addition,under the assumption of loss aversion,the use of buyback contracts can still achieve supply chain coordination,and the buyback price is proportional to loss aversion and wholesale price.

关 键 词：供应链协调 风险规避 多重心理账户 回购契约 融资需求 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]