COVID-19疫情下口罩转扩产联盟稳定性研究  

Research on dynamic coalition stability of mask production under COVID-19 epidemic

作　　者：危小超[1] 张虹宇 盛宁 聂规划[1] WEI Xiaochao;ZHANG Hongyu;SHENG Ning;NIE Guihua(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,武汉430070

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第12期3282-3293,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71601151);教育部人文社会科学项目(16YJC630131)。

摘　　要：基于随机演化博弈和突变论,研究新冠疫情下口罩转扩产联盟稳定性演化过程.其中,借助演化博弈论,建立复制动态方程,引入白噪声和Ito随机微分方程建立随机动力学模型.结合突变论,利用极限概率密度函数将博弈模型转化为突变模型,分析新冠疫情下口罩转扩产联盟结构性及扰动性突变现象.仿真模拟超额收益、违约成本及初始合作概率对联盟非计划性解体的影响.研究表明:1)口罩转扩产联盟由稳定到解体的结构性突变源于超额收益和违约成本变量组合通过分歧点集合时产生的自组织相变;2)当超额收益和违约成本取值组合在分歧点集合内部时,联盟因外界随机干扰产生扰动性突变,扰动性突变易恢复;3)超额收益对联盟稳定性具有负向作用,违约成本和初始合作概率具有一定正向作用.本文集成随机演化博弈和突变论研究口罩转扩产联盟稳定性,为动态联盟非线性研究提供了新思路;并为新冠疫情下建立口罩转扩产联盟、实施非常规管控措施提供决策支持.Based on evolutionary game and catastrophe theory,the stability of dynamic coalition of mask production is explored.This research introduces the Gaussian White noise and a Ito stochastic differential equation to develop dynamical equation.Then,probability density function is introduced to build the catastrophe model.Finally,some numerical simulations are given to explore the influence of excess return,default cost and initial cooperation probability.The results show:1)Catastrophic change occurs suddenly when parameters cross the borderline of bifurcation aggregation;2)The catastrophic change occurs due to external disturbance when parameters are inside the bifurcation aggregation which is easy to recover;3)The excess return affects negatively,and the default cost and the initial cooperation probability affect positively on the stability of dynamic coalition.This research integrates evolutionary game and catastrophe theory and provide a new idea for dynamic coalition research;supports the establishment of mask production dynamic coalition and implementation for unconventional control measures under the COVID-19 epidemic.

关 键 词：新冠疫情 口罩转扩产动态联盟 稳定性 突变论 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]