高管降薪政策是否影响国有企业创新--基于A股上市公司数据的实证研究  

WHETHER THE POLICY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION LIMIT AFFECTS THE INNOVATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES--An Empirical Study Based on the Data of A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：李钰 王平[1] LI Yu;WANG Ping(Business School,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,100872

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2022年第1期86-99,共14页Economic Theory and Business Management

摘　　要：本文选取A股上市公司2010—2019年经营数据,利用双重差分模型(DID)实证探究了国企高管降薪对企业创新的影响。研究结果显示,相较于非国有上市公司,国企高管降薪抑制了国有上市公司的创新研发投入;进一步研究表明,国企高管降薪政策对企业创新的抑制程度在不同功能定位的国有企业之间存在差异,公益类国有企业受第二次高管"降薪令"的抑制影响比商业类国有企业更加严重。本文为国企高管降薪对企业创新的影响提供了经验证据,丰富了国企高管降薪政策方面的文献,对未来国企高管薪酬政策的制定具有一定的参考意义。Using the difference-in-difference(DID)method and a sample containing the operating data of A-share listed companies in China between 2010 and 2019,this study tests the impact of the executive compensation limit policy on enterprise innovation.The result shows that,compared with the non-state-owned enterprises(NSOEs),the policy inhibited the innovation investment of the state-owned enterprises(SOEs).In addition,the degree of inhibition of the policy on enterprise innovation is different across the SOEs with different functions.Public welfare state-owned enterprises are more restrained by the second executive pay cut order than commercial state-owned enterprises.This study provides empirical evidence and policy implications for the executive compensation limit in SOEs and enterprise innovation,as well as enriching the research of the executive compensation limit policy.

关 键 词：高管降薪政策 企业创新 高管激励 国有企业分类 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.9[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51F273.1