国有企业股份制改革、市场准入与环境政策  

State-owned enterprise shareholding system reform,market access and environmental policy

作　　者：邢安琪 Xing Anqi(Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing,Jiangsu,211815)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《市场周刊》2022年第2期30-33,76,共5页Market Weekly

摘　　要：文章通过构建一个三阶段多家企业的混合寡头博弈模型,考察在不同的市场准入程度下,国有企业股份制改革如何影响政府的环境政策。研究表明,在不同的市场准入壁垒中,国有企业股份制改革将对政府的环境政策产生不同的影响。当市场准入程度低时,政府允许企业可排污量随着民营化程度先上升再下降;当市场准入程度高时,可允许排污量随着民营化程度的上升而上升。By constructing a mixed oligopoly game model with multiple enterprises in three stages,this paper investigates how the shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises affects the environmental policy of the government under different market access degrees.The research shows that the shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises will have different effects on the environmental policies of the government in different market access barriers.When the degree of market access is low,the pollution emission allowed by the government increases first and then decreases with the degree of privatization.When the degree of market access is high,emissions can be allowed to rise with the increasing degree of privatization.

关 键 词：混合寡头 股份制改革 环境政策 市场准入 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]