控股股东股权质押与股价崩盘风险——基于信息披露质量的中介效应研究  

Stock Right Pledge of Controlling Shareholder and Stock Price Crash Risk:Based on a Study on Mediating Effect of Quality of Information Disclosure

作　　者：刘翰林[1] 王子蕊 LIU Han-lin;WANG Zi-rui(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期34-41,共8页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学新兴(交叉)学科重大扶持课题子课题(9XXJC01ZD-1)。

摘　　要：文章基于2007—2020年中国所有A股上市公司的面板财务数据,运用中介效应模型,对控股股东的股权质押、信息披露质量和公司股价崩盘风险三者的关联关系展开了实证分析。研究结果显示:控股股东的股权质押行为将明显提高公司的股价崩盘风险,亦即质押的比率越高,公司的股价崩盘风险也越高;信息披露质量与股价崩盘风险显著负相关,亦即信息披露质量降低会增大公司股价崩盘的风险;在控股股东的股权质押行为和公司股价崩盘风险两者的关系中,信息披露质量发挥了重要的中介作用。Based on the panel data of A-share listed companies from 2007-2019,the mediating effect model is taken to analyze the relationship among the stock pledge of controlling shareholder,the quality of information disclosure and the stock price crash risk empirically.The results show that stock pledge of controlling shareholder will significantly increase the risk of the company's stock price crash risk,and the higher the proportion of the equity pledge,the higher the risk of the stock price crash.The quality of information disclosure is significantly negative related to the stock price crash risk,and the decline of information disclosure quality will significantly increase the risk of the company's stock price crash.Quality of information disclosure plays an important mediating effect in the relationship between the stock pledge of controlling shareholder and the risk of stock price crash risk.

关 键 词：控股股东股权质押 信息披露质量 股价崩盘风险 中介效应 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]