TPL主导下的生鲜电商三级供应链决策分析  

Decision of TPL-led Fresh Produce Three-layer E-commerce Supply Chain

作　　者：徐慧婷[1] XU Huiting(School of Business,Xiamen City Vocational College,Xiamen 361000,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门城市职业学院商贸系,福建厦门361000

出　　处：《工业工程》2022年第1期75-82,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：福建省教育科学“十四五”规划2021年度课题资助项目(FJJKGZ21-103)。

摘　　要：研究由TPL、生鲜电商、生鲜产品供应商组成的三级供应链系统,其中生鲜农产品的市场需求受网上零售价格、安全追溯系统可用性、新鲜度的影响。在TPL主导下,运用Stackelberg博弈模型,分析生鲜电商、生鲜产品供应商不同领导权下的最优决策和最大利润,得出以下结论:生鲜产品供应商作为第二领导下的TPL利润、安全追溯系统可用性、保鲜水平、市场需求均大于其作为第三领导时的情形;不同领导权对供应链企业的利润也会产生影响,利润偏向于领导权大的一方。然而不管哪种决策模型,其供应链利润均小于集中决策下的情形。In order to study the optimal strategy and maximum profit of the TPL-led fresh produce three-layer e-commerce supply chain with the market demand which is affected by online retail price,availability of safety traceability system and freshness,the Stackelberg game model consisting of a TPL,a supplier,and a fresh produce e-commerce enterprise is constructed to investigate the impact of different leadership on optimal strategy and profit.The strategy differences of supply chain with different leadership are analyzed,and the theoretical derivations and results are illustrated with numerical examples.The results show that:the TPL profit,availability of safety traceability system,fresh-keeping effort and market demand when the supplier is under the second leadership are greater than those when it is under the third leadership.Different leadership of product suppliers will also have an impact on the profits of supply chain enterprises,and the profits tend to be those with higher leadership.However,the total profits of the two modes under decentralized decision-making are lower than those under centralized decision-making.

关 键 词：博弈论 供应链决策 生鲜电商 三级供应链 权利结构 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]