皮尔士论知识的基础及其对当代知识论的启示  

Peirce on the Foundation of Knowledge and Its Enlightenment to Contemporary Theory of Knowledge

作　　者：周靖 ZHOU Jing(Institute of Philosophy,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200235,China)

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院哲学研究所,上海200235

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2022年第1期10-16,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“剑桥实用主义研究”(21CZX050)。

摘　　要：20世纪中叶开始,奎因、塞拉斯、戴维森等人对经验主义的攻击使得经验失去了证成知识的作用,威廉姆森倡导的"知识优先"论题将知识视为不可被进一步分析、拆解的单位,经验不再起到首要作用,这最终带来了知识和经验在当代知识论中的分裂问题。皮尔士关于知识基础的讨论蕴含了将经验视为限制和塑造知识的力量,以及将知识视为实际探究的起点这两种表面上对立的立场。皮尔士通过对符号活动中外在事物、对象、心灵、共同体、实在,以及真理之间关系的勾绘展现其知识论立场,从中可以挖掘出一套解决当代知识论中知识与经验分裂的有效方案。Since the middle of the last century,Sellars,Quine,Davidson,and a few other philosophers’continuous attack on empiricism has made the experience unauthentic in justifying the knowledge.The“knowledge first”thesis advocated by Williamson regards knowledge as the primary concept that cannot be further analyzed and dismantled.Hence experience is no longer privileged.Those facts of which ultimately bring about the splitting of knowledge and experience in the contemporary theory of knowledge.Peirce’s theory of knowledge includes two apparently opposite positions of accepting experience as the power to limit and shape knowledge and the knowledge as the starting point of practical inquiry.Peirce explicates his epistemological position by sketching the relationship between external things,objects,mind,community,reality,and truth in the semiosis,from which an effective solution can be weaved to overcome the split between knowledge and experience in contemporary theory of knowledge.

关 键 词：皮尔士 经验 知识论 符号活动 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]