非控股大股东退出威胁与企业并购绩效  

Non-controlling Large Shareholders’ Exit Threats and M&A Performance

作　　者：王志芳[1] 索成瑞 WANG Zhi-fang;SUO Cheng-rui(School of Accounting,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《经济问题》2022年第3期74-83,共10页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“公司章程反收购条款设置中的管理层防御及经济后果研究”(19BGL060)。

摘　　要：非控股大股东作为并购活动中的重要参与者,其退出威胁方式的隐性治理作用逐渐引起学术界的关注。基于此,以2013—2019年沪深A股的并购事件为样本,研究非控股大股东退出威胁与企业并购绩效的关系及其间的作用机理。实证结果表明,非控股大股东退出威胁能有效改善和提升企业并购绩效,作用方式为抑制管理层私利及吸引媒体关注,且在非控股大股东退出威胁更为可信、威胁程度更强、非国有及信息环境质量较好的企业中,非控股大股东退出威胁对企业并购绩效的积极作用更为显著。研究结果揭示了非控股大股东退出威胁对提升企业并购绩效的有效性,为非控股大股东采取灵活有效的方式来参与公司治理和完善公司决策提供了真实可靠的实证参考。Non-controlling major shareholders are important participants in M&A,and the implicit governance effect of their exit threats has gradually attracted the attention of academia.Thus,using the 2013—2019 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share M&A deals as a sample to explore the relationship between the exit threat of noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate M&A performance,and the mechanism of action between them.The empirical results show that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can effectively improve and enhance corporate M&A performance by restraining management’s private interests and attracting media attention,and in companies where the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders is more credible,the threat level is stronger,non-state-owned and the quality of the information environment is better,the positive effect of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders on corporate M&A performance is more significant.The research results reveal the effectiveness of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders in improving corporate M&A performance,and provide a true and reliable empirical reference for non-controlling major shareholders to take a flexible and effective way to participate in corporate governance and improve corporate decision-making.

关 键 词：非控股大股东 退出威胁 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]