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机构地区:[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,410082
出 处:《会计研究》2021年第10期126-151,共26页Accounting Research
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL071)的阶段性成果。
摘 要:非国有股东治理效应的发挥是全面深化我国国企改革的重要环节。但当国企控制权发生转让时,非国有控制性股东可能由监督动机转变为掏空动机从而降低内部控制质量。本文基于国企改革的制度背景,选取了2009-2018年沪深A股非金融类上市国企为研究样本,从内部控制质量层面实证检验了国有控制权转让对改制企业内部治理的影响,并从非国有控股股东的成本敏感性、合规遵循度以及掏空动机三个维度探讨了其作用机理。研究结果表明:(1)在国企改革过程中,国有控制权发生转让会显著降低改制企业的内部控制质量,但国有控制权转让引起的改制企业组织变革和组织内部政策的不稳定性并非内部控制质量降低的主要原因;(2)进一步分析结果表明,国有控制权转让后,非国有控制性股东较高的成本敏感性、较低的合规遵循度以及较强的掏空动机是降低改制企业内部控制质量的重要原因;(3)拓展性分析结果表明,国有控制权转让后,较好的外部法制环境、较高的内部股权制衡程度会显著抑制国有控制权转让对内部控制质量的负面影响。本文的实证结果丰富了我国国企改革中非国有股东治理效应经济后果和内部控制质量影响因素的文献,对推进我国国企改革具有重要参考价值。The governance role of non-state shareholders is an important aspect of comprehensively deepening the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises.However,when state-owned control rights are transferred,non-state-owned shareholders may change from supervisory motivation to tunneling motivation,thereby reducing the quality of internal control.Based on the institutional background of the reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper selects the 2009-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed state-owned enterprises as the research sample to empirically test the impact of the transfer of state-owned control rights on the internal governance of enterprises.This article explores the mechanism of the reduction of internal control quality from the perspectives of non-state-owned controllers’ cost sensitivity,compliance degree,and tunneling motivation.The research results show that:(1) During the reform of state-owned enterprises,the transfer of state-owned control rights will significantly reduce the quality of internal control of the reformed enterprises.(2) We find that the negative effect of the transfer of state-owned control rights on the quality of internal control will gradually increase over time,which indicates that the organizational changes and the instability of internal organizational policies caused by the transfer of state-owned control rights are not the main reason for the reduction of internal control quality.(3) In further research,this paper finds that after the transfer of state-owned control rights,non-state-owned shareholders’ higher cost sensitivity,lower compliance with regulations,and stronger incentives for tunneling are important reasons for their reduction of internal control quality.This article enriches the research on the economic consequences of China’s state-owned enterprise reform and the influencing factors of internal control quality,and has a certain reference value for better promoting the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises.
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