云仓模式下相关利益者演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders Under Cloud Warehouse Model

作　　者：酒艳妮 胡大伟[1] 王兴隆 JIU Yan-ni;HU Da-wei;WANG Xing-long(School of Transportation Engineering,Changan University,Xian 710064,China)

机构地区：[1]长安大学运输工程学院,陕西西安710064

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2022年第2期56-68,共13页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：随着物流经济的快速发展,共享物流为提高仓储管理效率提供了新的途径.通过分析共享仓储中的云仓模式,针对云仓平台使用中的信用监管问题,构建了该模式下云仓平台、仓储供给方以及仓储需求方三方的演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析了各参与方策略选择的演化稳定性,并使用Matlab进行了数值仿真,分析不同参数变化对演化结果的影响.研究表明:云仓平台与仓储供给方的策略选择相互之间有较大影响,而仓储需求方的策略选择受其他两方影响较大;降低云仓平台的惩罚成本,增大对虚假信息的惩罚力度及降低仓储供给方虚假时的净收益有利于达到系统理想稳定状态.研究结论可为云仓平台及仓储供需方决策管理提供参考.With the rapid development of logistics economy,shared logistics provides a new way to improve the efficiency of warehouse management.Based on the analysis of cloud warehouse model in shared warehouse,aiming at the credit supervision in the use of cloud warehouse platform,the evolutionary game model of cloud warehouse platform,storage supplier and storage demand party is constructed.The evolutionary stability of each participant strategy selection is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory,and the numerical simulation is carried out by MATLAB,Analysis of the influence of different parameters on evolution results.The results show that:the strategy choice of the cloud warehouse platform and the warehouse supplier has a great influence on each other,while the strategy choice of the warehouse demander is greatly affected by the other two parties;reducing the penalty cost of the cloud warehouse platform,increasing the penalty for false information and reducing the net income of the warehouse supplier when they are false are conducive to achieving the ideal stable state of the system.The research conclusion can provide a reference for the decision-making management of cloud warehouse platform and warehouse supplier and demander.

关 键 词：共享物流 共享仓储 云仓模式 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F259.2F724.6