基于可修改订购策略的供应链信息泄露问题研究  

Information Leakage in a Supply Chain Based on Revisable Ordering Strategy

作　　者：许炯楼 蹇明[1,2] XU Jionglou;JIAN Ming(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都611756 [2]西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都611756

出　　处：《综合运输》2022年第2期87-100,共14页China Transportation Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL104)。

摘　　要：考虑了一个供应商和两个相互产量竞争的零售商构成的二级供应链,其中拥有确切市场需求信息的零售商称为在位零售商,另一个零售商称为新进入零售商,在位零售商与供应商之间进行市场需求信息共享。由于存在供应商向新进入零售商泄露市场需求信息的风险,设计了在位零售商和供应商之间的可修改订购策略,通过博弈论分析发现:当供应商进行信息泄漏时,可修改订购策略可以提高在位零售商的收益,在一定程度上弥补信息泄露导致的收益损害;利用可修改订购策略,在特定的情形下在位零售商可以进行"伪装"决策来隐藏真实的市场需求信息,令与之竞争的零售商无法获取准确的市场信息;可修改订购策略的存在会影响零售商的订购总量从而影响供应商的直接收益,在适合的参数设定下,可修改订购策略可以防止供应商信息泄露行为的发生。Information leakage always plays a negative role in the cooperation and information sharing of a supply chain.It is important for us to mitigate the adverse effects of information leakage.This work considers a stylized supply chain with one supplier selling to two competing retailers,one of whom has private information about uncertain market demand and order first.The ordering information may be leaked to the uninformed retailer by the supplier to make a higher profit.So the informed retailer is given a chance to revise his order quantity after the uninformed retailer has ordered.We use Game Theory to demonstrate that the informed retailer is likely to realize higher profits from the revisable ordering strategy even when his information gets leaked.Moreover,because of the chance to revise the order quantity,mimicking ordering is available to the informed retailer for concealing his true demand information to the supplier under leakage.Most important of all,the informed retailer’s revisable ordering strategy makes it possible for him to prevent the supplier from leaking his order information under some certain circumstances.

关 键 词：信息共享 市场需求信息 信息泄露 可修改订购策略 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]