计及消费领域的碳补贴政策演化博弈  

An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field

作　　者：魏琦[1] 丁亚楠 WEI Qi;DING Ya-nan(School of Economic and Management,Lanzhou University of Technology,Lanzhou 730050,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州理工大学经济管理学院,甘肃兰州730050

出　　处：《中国环境科学》2022年第3期1456-1465,共10页China Environmental Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(7196302);甘肃省教育厅揭榜挂帅项目(2021jyjbgs-08)。

摘　　要：考虑到企业和消费者的低碳策略往往受到政府补贴政策的影响,构建了消费者、消费领域相关企业和政府的三方演化博弈模型,探讨多种因素对各主体策略选择的影响机制.研究表明:企业低碳生产的概率与政府补贴力度、消费者低碳偏好、放弃低碳生产的机会成本和市场损失正相关,与生产方式转变成本负相关;消费者低碳消费的概率与政府补贴力度、低碳偏好收益正相关,与低碳产品和普通产品的价格差值负相关;政府只有在潜在收益超过消费补贴与生产补贴流程成本的差值时才选择补贴消费者,否则政府更倾向于生产补贴.运用仿真工具验证了上述结论,并据此提出有助于促进各方减排行为的对策建议.Considering that the low-carbon strategies of enterprises and consumers are often affected by government subsidy policies,this paper constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of consumers, relevant enterprise and the government, and discussed the influence mechanism of various factors on the strategy choice of each subject. The results show that: The low-carbon behaviors of enterprises are positively driven by government subsidies, low carbon preference of consumers, opportunity cost of giving up low-carbon production and market loss, and negatively driven by the cost of production mode change;The low-carbon behaviors of consumers are positively driven by the intensity of government subsidies and the benefit of low carbon preference, and negatively driven by the price difference between low-carbon products and ordinary products;The government chooses to subsidize consumers only when the potential benefits exceed the difference between the cost of consumption subsidy and production subsidy process;otherwise, the government is more inclined to subsidize production. This paper used simulation tools to verify the above conclusions,which helped to promote all mitigation actions countermeasures and suggestions were put forward.

关 键 词：消费领域减排 碳普惠 低碳生产 低碳消费 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]