管理劳动支出是否挤压利润率?——基于美国上市企业经验数据分析  

Does the Managerial Labor Expenditure Squeeze Profit Rates? An Analysis Based on the Empirical Data of US Listed Enterprises

作　　者：陈亮 陈志超[3] 时英 Chen Liang;Chen Zhichao;Shi Ying(Institute of China's Economic Reform&Development,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Economics,Renmin University of China.Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学中国经济改革与发展研究院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心,北京100872 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《教学与研究》2022年第2期39-50,共12页Teaching and Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“中国特色社会主义基本经济制度与国家治理现代化研究”(项目号:20ZDA014);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“产业结构演化视角下的中国生态文明与绿色发展研究”(项目号:18JJD790016);中国经济改革与发展研究院项目“中国工业绿色低碳转型发展的理论、政策与实践路径”(项目号:ICERD18Z03)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：管理是企业协调与控制劳动过程的重要活动,管理过程中所产生的费用的性质和影响一直是政治经济学研究的重要问题。随着资本主义社会分工与企业内部分工的深化,以组织与协调的生产性管理劳动和以监督与控制的非生产性管理劳动日益分离和对立。相关条件不变时,作为生产性管理劳动报酬的生产性管理劳动支出增加,资本的逐利特性将促使生产性管理劳动员工的无酬劳动时间延长,带来剩余价值量上升,即利润增加。而以支付非生产性管理劳动报酬为主的非生产性管理劳动支出,其本质是剩余价值的一种转换形式,这部分支出的增加将消耗企业的剩余价值,即利润下降。那么,经验上,管理劳动支出是有助于提升利润率还是会挤压利润率?为此,论文运用美国上市企业数据对所提论点进行验证,发现企业管理劳动支出与利润率呈现倒"U"型关系,这一研究将有助于从企业微观层面深化对马克思劳动价值论的认识与应用。Management is an essential activity for enterprises to coordinate and control the labor process. The nature and influence of the managerial labor expenditure generated in the management process have always been key issues in the research of political economy. With the deepening of the capitalist social division of labor and the internal division of labor in enterprises, there has been increasing separation and opposition between the productive managerial labor in the form of organization and coordination, and the non-productive managerial labor in the form of supervision and control. With relevant conditions being constant, as the expenditure(or remuneration) for the productive managerial labor increases, capital, out of the instinct of pursuing profits, tends to prolong the unpaid labor time of these management employees, therefore resulting in the increase in surplus value, i.e. increase in profits. However, the expenditure(or remuneration) for the non-productive managerial labor is essentially a transformed form of surplus value. The increase of such expenditure consumes surplus value, which decreases profits of enterprises. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the managerial lobor expenditure helps raise or reduce profit rates empirically. Based on the data of US listed enterprises, we find an inverted U relationship between the enterprise management expenditure and profit rates. This research can improve our understanding and application of Marx’s labor theory of value at the micro level of enterprises.

关 键 词：生产性管理劳动 非生产性管理劳动 管理劳动支出 利润率 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F831.51