基于多种污染物损害视角的地方政府间环境规制合作策略研究  

Research on Cooperative Strategy of Environmental Regulation among Local Governments from the Perspective of Multiple Pollutants Damage

作　　者：凌星元 孟卫东[1] 黄波[1] 李宇雨[2] LING Xing-yuan;MENG Wei-dong;HUANG Bo;LI Yu-yu(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 400047,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2022年第2期169-180,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：重庆市社会科学规划项目(2021NDQN50);全国文化名家暨“四个一批人才”项目(中宣干字[2016]133号);重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究一般项目(21SKGH339);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573025);重庆市教育科学规划课题(2021-GX-045)。

摘　　要：考虑多种(非累积性和累积性)污染物对环境造成不同损害的前提下,首先基于Stackelberg博弈分析占主导的地方政府和跟随的工业企业各自的动态决策过程,确定工业企业的最优污染物排放量;随后运用最优控制理论构建两个相邻地区在非合作和合作博弈下关于跨界污染最优控制的博弈模型,分析地方政府的环境治理策略,包括最优的环境保护税、污染治理投资,探讨污染物存量的动态变化情况,并对此两种博弈结构进行了比较分析。理论及仿真分析表明:无论地区间是非合作还是合作博弈,工业企业的最优污染物排放量与其污染物减排比例的相关性不确定;每个地区的最优环境保护税与污染物减排比例呈正相关。但合作博弈下,每个地区均会考虑其非累积性污染物排放对其相邻地区造成的损害;每个地区均会增加污染治理投资;所有地区的总收益高于非合作博弈下,且高出部分(合作剩余)受累积性污染物的损害以及非累积性污染物对相邻地区损害的影响,但是与非累积性污染物对本地区的损害无关。Especially in recent years,a single source of emissions is typically comprised of multiple pollutants that also lead to regional and global negative externalities in reality.On the one hand,some pollutants discharged by industrial enterprises during the production process will have a short-term,regional and non-cumulative impact on their source area and adjacent areas.Examples of pollutants causing these impacts include sulfur dioxide,suspended particulates in the air,and odor pollutants discharged in production,which have more local,regional,and negative external influences on the region and adjacent areas.On the other hand,other pollutants discharged through industrial enterprises will increase to existing pollution stocks,and gradually accumulate with long-term global cumulative impact.Examples of pollutants with such negative environmental impacts include greenhouse gases and CFCs,etc.With the gradual accumulation,a series of global environmental problems such as global warming have been caused.Therefore,we should not only pay attention to the short-term regional environmental problems,but also to the long-term global environmental problems.Under this background,considering the different environmental damage caused by multiple pollutants(non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants),the optimal control theory is used to construct a game model for optimal control of transboundary pollution.Firstly,based on Stackelberg game,the dynamic decision-making processes of local governments as leaders and industrial enterprises as followers are analyzed,and the optimal pollutant emissions of industrial enterprises are determined.Subsequently,a game model of optimal control of transboundary pollution in two adjacent regions under non-cooperative and cooperative games is constructed to analyze the environmental governance strategies of local governments,including the optimal environmental protection tax and investment in environmental pollution control,and to explore the dynamic changes of pollutant stocks.Meanwhile,the two g

关 键 词：环境规制 合作策略 跨界污染 非累积性污染物 累积性污染物 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]