数据驱动营销下电子商务平台的渠道均衡策略研究  

Research on Channel Equilibrium Strategy of E-commerce Platform under Data-driven Marketing

作　　者：杨蕊 马骋 YANG Rui;MA Cheng(School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266061, China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266061

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第1期93-101,共9页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金(批准号:18YJC630119)资助;山东省自然科学基金面上项目(批准号:ZR2020MA024)资助;山东省社科规划项目(批准号:20CSDJ16)资助。

摘　　要：由于电子商务平台存在竞争,构建了由一个制造商和两个平台组成的博弈模型,并运用Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡,分析了不同渠道模式下的均衡定价及利润,研究两个平台在同一消费市场进行销售时的渠道均衡选择问题。在均衡状态下,收益分享比例较小时,随着数据驱动营销效率的增加,传统平台由于转售模式采购成本的增加会选择代理模式;收益分享比例适中时,两个平台均会选择代理模式以追求渠道效应;收益分享比例较大时,随着数据驱动营销效率的增加,传统平台由于缺乏零售层面的竞争优势会选择转售模式。Due to the competition of e-commerce platform,a game modelwas constructed,which was composed of one manufacturer and two platforms.Equilibrium pricing and profit under different channel modes were analyzed by using Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium.The channel equilibrium choice of the two platforms was studied in the sales process of the same consumer market.When the proportion of revenue sharing in the equilibrium state is small,with the increase of data-driven marketing efficiency,the traditional platform will select the agency selling mode due to the increased procurement costs in the reselling mode.When the revenue sharing proportion is moderate,the two platforms will select the agency selling mode to pursue channel efficiency.When the revenue sharing proportion is large,with the increase of data-driven marketing efficiency,the traditional platform will select the agency selling mode due to the lack of competitive advantage at the retail level.

关 键 词：电子商务平台 渠道模式 零售竞争 数据驱动营销 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]