董事会秘书持股后信息沟通效率更高吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据  

Is the Information Communication Efficiency Higher after the Board Secretary Holds Shares?Based on the Empirical Evidence of Chinese A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：刘佳伟 邓博夫[2] 吉利[2] Liu Jiawei;Deng Bofu;Ji Li(Dongwu Business School,Soochow University,Suzhou 215021,China;Accounting School,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215021 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2022年第2期36-51,共16页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71902161);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA630041);苏州大学人文社会科学科研项目团队资助项目(21XM1002)。

摘　　要：本文以企业盈余价值相关性衡量董事会秘书信息沟通效率,实证检验董事会秘书激励方式如何影响企业盈余价值相关性及其作用机理。研究发现,作为企业与投资者间的信息沟通桥梁,董秘持股有助于提升企业盈余信息的价值相关性,同时存在趋利避害动机。这一结果在国有企业、股权制衡度较高的样本以及当企业获得媒体正面报道较多时更为明显。作用机制检验结果表明,董秘持股有助于抑制大股东掏空行为,并且通过增强企业年报中的正面语调向市场投资者传递良好的经营管理预期,从而调动市场投资者的积极性。但作为管理者中的一员,董秘持股后未能在会计信息披露环节有效抑制管理层盈余管理动机,对于企业会计信息质量未能起到明显改善作用。另外,董秘薪酬与声誉激励相对股权而言在激励其有效履行信息发布与沟通责任方面存在替代性关系。本文丰富拓展了董秘激励的研究范畴,对于充分提升董秘信息沟通效率具有一定的启示。As an important part of corporate governance mechanism,the board secretary bears the important responsibility of corporate information disclosure and communication,which directly affects the way and content of market investors’information acquisition,and is significant to reduce the cost of investors’information acquisition and stabilize their investment confidence.Based on the identity and background of the board secretary,there have been studies to investigate the information supervision function and transmission efficiency of the board secretary.However,the basic fact of low shareholding ratio of the board secretary in China has not been taken into account,which meets the“convergence of interests hypothesis”.The independence of board secretary will be affected by major shareholders and managers,and whether it can effectively enhance the value relevance of earnings information has become an important research issue.With the use of listed firms from 2010 to 2018 in China as samples,this paper explores whether the board secretary’s shareholding affects corporate earnings relevance.Firstly,the board secretary’s shareholding improves corporate earnings relevance,yet there is a motivation to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages.This result is more obvious in state-owned enterprises,samples with high degree of equity balance,and when enterprises get more positive media attention and reports.Secondly,the mechanism test results show that the board secretary’s shareholding suppresses the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,and transfers good management expectations to market investors by enhancing the positive tone in financial reports,so as to stimulate the enthusiasm of market investors.However,as one of the managers,the holding board secretary cannot effectively restrain the management’s motivation of earnings management,which cannot significantly improve the quality of accounting information.Finally,compared with shareholding,monetary compensation and reputation incentive constitute an altern

关 键 词：董秘持股 董秘声誉 信息沟通效率 盈余价值相关性 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]