内部人减持自利动机与并购业绩承诺  

Self-interest Motivation of Insiders’Shares Selling and Performance Commitment in M&A

作　　者：叶会[1] 陈君萍 YE Hui;CHEN JunPing(Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财贸研究》2022年第2期80-96,共17页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“市场化并购环境下业绩承诺的使用动机及作用机制研究”(18YJC630229);国家社会科学基金一般项目“基于供应链调整的企业海外并购战略研究”(20GBL030)。

摘　　要：以A股上市公司在2009—2019年发生的并购重组事件为样本,考察内部人减持自利动机对并购业绩承诺的影响。研究发现:并购前一年的限售股解禁比例对并购业绩承诺的使用具有显著的正向影响;有业绩承诺的公司,内部人在并购后会进行更频繁和更大规模的减持,并且能够从减持中获取更高的长期超额回报。拓展性检验结果显示:融资融券制度和减持新规可以有效抑制内部人减持自利动机驱动的并购业绩承诺;当上市公司所处的行业环境越不利、管理层短视程度越高时,内部人减持自利动机对并购业绩承诺的影响越大。Based on samples of M&As happened from 2009 to 2019,this paper studies the impact of self-interest motivation of insiders’shares selling on performance commitments in M&A.This paper finds that the ratio of share lockups’expiration one year before M&A has a significant positive impact on the use of M&A performance commitment,insiders of corporate with performance commitment sell shares more frequently and sell larger size of shares after M&A,and insiders have higher abnormal return from shares selling.The results of the extensibility test show that margin trading mechanism and new regulation of insider selling can effectively restrain performance commit in M&A that motived by insiders’self-interest motivation of shares selling,and insiders’self-interest motivation of shares selling will have a larger effect on performance commitment when industry environment is more unfavorable and managers are more myopic.

关 键 词：内部人减持 业绩承诺 并购 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理] F830.91[经济管理—国民经济]