Simple Contracts to Coordinate the Capacity Procurement Model with Asymmetric Demand Information  

作　　者：LI Linqiu LIU Ke 

机构地区：[1]Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China [2]University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2022年第1期245-263,共19页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.72071198。

摘　　要：This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information.Under the model,the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product.Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity.In the literature,some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem.However,the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts(linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement)can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing.Besides,the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties.To avoid punishment,the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain.The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement.The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

关 键 词：Asymmetric information capacity investment mechanism design supply chain management 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]