中国式税收分成制下政府间竞争的运行逻辑——理论机制和解释框架  

The Logic of Intergovernmental Competition under the Chinese-Style Revenue-Sharing System——Theoretical Mechanism and Explanatory Framework

作　　者：汪彤[1] WANG Tong(School of Economics,Minzu University of China,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央民族大学经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《经济体制改革》2022年第2期129-135,共7页Reform of Economic System

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“营改增后增值税收入分享机制优化研究”(18BJL115)。

摘　　要：地方政府竞争被普遍视为中国改革开放以来经济发展的重要推动力。财政分权理论和政治晋升理论提供了地方政府竞争激励来源的理论框架。分税制改革后,以共享税为主的税收分成似乎成为更符合“分权逻辑”的中国路径。本文基于税收分成的事实性特征,从财政收入来源及分享规则的基本制度要素——税基、税收分成比例和税权入手,基于政府间横向与纵向税收关系,阐释地方政府间横向税收竞争的一般性与纵向税收竞争的独特性,两者依托于税收分成制的绑定效应与政治治理机制,形成相互制约、相互影响、双向互动的政府间竞争格局。Local Government Competition is widely regarded as an important driver of China’s economic development from the start of the reform and opening-up policy.Fiscal decentralization theory and political promotion theory provide a theoretical framework for the source of competition and incentives for local governments.However,after the reform of the revenue-sharing system,the changes in China’s fiscal decentralization relationship are mainly reflected in the adjustment of the revenue-sharing system based on shared taxes.Revenue-sharing seems to be a Chinese path that is more in line with the “decentralization logic”.This paper tries to focus on mechanism based on facts and documents starting from the revenue-sharing,analyze the characteristics of revenue-sharing from fiscal revenue sources and three basic institutional elements of tax sharing rules:the tax base,the proportion of tax sharing,and tax power,and explains the specific motivation and performance of tax competition among local governments,as well as the mechanism and effect of the tax game between the central government and local governments.The two rely on the binding effect and the political governance mechanism of the revenue-sharing system,which forms mutual restraint,mutual influence and two-way interactive intergovernmental competition framework.

关 键 词：税收分成 税收竞争 地方政府 理论机制 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]