分析师关注与实体企业金融化  

Analyst Coverage and Financialization of Entity Enterprises

作　　者：秦建文[1] 胡金城 操应翔 Qin Jianwen;Hu Jincheng;Cao Yingxiang(School of Economics,China-ASEAN Institute of Financial Cooperation,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China;School of Business Administration,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China)

机构地区：[1]广西大学经济学院,中国-东盟金融合作学院,南宁530004 [2]广西大学工商管理学院,南宁530004

出　　处：《技术经济》2022年第3期139-152,共14页Journal of Technology Economics

摘　　要：本文从外部治理视角考察了分析师关注对实体企业金融化行为的影响效应及机理。结果表明,分析师关注对实体企业金融化具有显著的负向影响,即企业受到分析师关注的程度越高,其金融化水平越低。在控制内生性之后,结果依然保持稳健。进一步研究表明,分析师关注主要通过降低信息不对称程度、缓解企业代理冲突两条渠道影响企业金融化。本文还发现,在国有企业和公司治理水平较差的企业中,分析师关注对企业金融化的负向作用更加明显。分析师关注通过抑制企业金融化行为,进而促进企业创新和实物资本投资。本文不仅丰富了公司外部治理与企业金融化相关领域的研究,而且为加强分析师队伍建设、防范实体经济“脱实向虚”提供了经验证据。From the perspective of external governance,the impact and mechanism of analyst coverage on entity enterprise financialization behavior were empirically studied.It is found that analyst coverage has a significant negative impact on entity enterprise financialization,the higher the degree of analyst coverage,the lower the level of enterprise financialization.After controlling endogeneity,the results remain robust.Further researches show that analyst coverage mainly affects enterprise financialization through reducing the degree of information asymmetry and alleviating enterprise agency conflict;moreover,analyst coverage has a more obvious negative effect on enterprise financialization in state-owned enterprises and companies with poor corporate governance.Analyst coverage can promote firms’innovation and physical capital investment by suppressing enterprise financialization.This paper not only enriches the research in the fields of corporate external governance and enterprise financialization,but also provides empirical evidence for strengthening the construction of analyst team and preventing the“disenchantment from reality”of the real economy.

关 键 词：分析师关注 企业金融化 代理冲突 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]