基于静态博弈模型的网购平台“杀熟”行为研究--以“首单优惠”为例  

Research on Big Data Discriminatory Pricing Behavior of Online Shopping Platforms Based on Static Game Model--Taking“First Order Discount”as an Example

作　　者：杨贺雯 YANG Hewen(Beijing University of Chemical Technology,Beijing 102202)

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学,北京102202

出　　处：《中国商论》2022年第6期56-58,共3页China Journal of Commerce

摘　　要：大数据时代,消费者个人信息极易被平台及商家获取利用,“杀熟”现象由此产生,其中最为显著的是“首单优惠”策略。在此背景下,消费者和商家之间的博弈将影响双方行为的选择,由此构建收益矩阵得出:影响“杀熟”的主要因素有消费者对自身权利重视程度、购买意愿、上期满意度及差异化定价下商家的潜在损失。为此,商家应理性使用大数据,消费者应审慎决策,政府应加强监管。In the era of big data,consumers’personal information is easily obtained and utilized by platforms and merchants,resulting in the phenomenon of big data discriminatory pricing,the most notable of which is the strategy of“first order discount”.In this context,the game between consumers and merchants will affect the behavioral choices of both parties.From this,the income matrix is constructed and it is concluded that the main factors aff ecting big data discriminatory pricing are consumers’attention to their own rights,purchase willingness,and satisfaction in the previous period.and potential losses for merchants under differentiated pricing.To this end,businesses should use big data rationally,and consumers should make prudent decisions,and the government should strengthen supervision.

关 键 词：“杀熟”现象 不完全信息静态博弈 差异化定价 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]