物种主义是一种人道主义——论威廉斯对“人类偏见”的辩护  

Speciesism Is Humanism:On Williams’ Defense of “Human Prejudice”

作　　者：魏犇群 Wei Benqun

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学伦理学与道德建设研究中心暨哲学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2022年第2期115-124,160,共11页World Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方百年元伦理学史研究”(项目编号:19ZDA036)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：当代有一批哲学家并不介意将“物种主义”作为其立场的标签,他们认为,人类的物种身份本身就是人类享有更高道德地位的充足依据。威廉斯的立场便可被归入这样的物种主义。本文认为,威廉斯对于物种主义或者人类偏见的辩护格外有趣和有力,不仅能够有效地打击到与其对立的立场,即道德个体主义,还可以回答物种主义所遭遇的两个相互关联的难题:一,物种主义为什么不可以类比于种族主义或者性别歧视?二,人类的物种身份为什么会具有规范意义或者道德相关性?There are several contemporary philosophers whose views can be grouped under the label of“speciesism”,according to which membership in the human species is a sufficient basis for a moral status higher than that of any animal.Bernard Williams is among them.In this paper,I argue that Williams’ defense of speciesism or human prejudice is worthy of serious consideration,not only can it effectively attack its rival position,namely moral individualism,it also has reasonable responses to two crucial,closely connected challenges faced by speciesism——that is,( 1) why is speciesism not analogous to sexism or racism?( 2) why is species membership normatively significant or morally relevant?

关 键 词：物种主义 人类偏见 威廉斯 道德个体主义 

分 类 号：B82-02[哲学宗教—伦理学]