所有者缺位与国企混合所有制改革的突破方向  

Absence of Owners and Breakthroughs Directions of Mixed-Ownership Reforms of SOEs

作　　者：郑志刚[1,2] 刘兰欣 ZHENG Zhi-gang;LIU Lan-xin(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing,100872,China;China Financial Policy Research Center,Renmin University of China,Beijing,100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872 [2]中国财政金融政策研究中心,北京100872

出　　处：《经济管理》2022年第2期5-16,共12页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：在以往相关文件与教科书的经典表述中,“所有者缺位”与“长的委托代理链条”被共同认为是引发国有企业作为一种企业制度出现的种种潜在公司治理问题的制度根源。通过剖析诊断,本文首先揭示所有者缺位才是国有企业种种潜在公司治理问题的根本“病灶”;针对国有企业所有者缺位这一根本病灶和由此衍生出来的“中国式内部人控制问题”典型“病症”,本文进一步“开出”化解这一根本病灶和典型病症的“实化”与“制衡”两剂“处方”。而引入具有“股东精神”、能够有效解决自身代理冲突的合格战略投资者成为“实化”国有企业缺位的所有者与“制衡”内部人控制,进而国有企业混合所有制改革寻求突破的关键。由于民资背景的战略投资者天然地具有股东精神,而经过有限合伙构架优化的基金通过后天的投资协议自动完成了激励合约设计,二者共同成为国有企业混改中潜在的合格战略投资者。The absence of owners and the long principal-agent chain are commonly considered as the root causes for corporate governance problems of state-owned enterprises(SOEs),according to the classical statements in relevant documents and textbooks.By comparing the two mainstream causes, the paper reveals that the absence of owners is the fundamental reason for corporate governance problems of state-owned enterprises.While on one side, long principal-agent chains and the derived proxy conflicts may appear after the separation of ownership and management, on the other side, the efficiency of modern corporations get improved.Thus, long principal-agent chains and the improved efficiency are two sides of coins.The impact of long principal-agent chains differs in corporations.In privately-held corporations, corporate-governance systems are arranged by shareholders with clear profit-pursuing motives and strong decision-making responsibilities, which would relieve the conflicts between principals and agents.However, it is impossible to mitigate agency costs under the circumstance of owner-absence in state-owned corporations.And lots of corporate governance problems may arise in SOEs, such as the insider control of Chinese style.Basing on fact that the absence of owners is the fundamental cause of SOEs’ governance problems and the Chinese-style insider control is one of the typical deprived problems, our paper then propose two solutions for cause-remedy and problem-settlement, named “materialization” and “check and balance” respectively.Firstly, the solution of “ materialization ” is aimed at remedying the cause of owner-absence.Through introducing qualified strategic investors, the SOEs are equipped with owners with clear motives in profit-pursuing, strong responsibilities in decision-making and great ability in problem-supervising and power-balancing.Secondly, the solution of “check and balance” is aimed at settling the problem of Chinese-style insider control.The interest-competition among shareholders cause

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 所有者缺位 中国式内部人控制 实化 均衡 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]