政府直接干预与内部人交易  

Government Direct Intervention and Insider Trading

作　　者：李志生[1] 金凌 Zhisheng Li;Ling Jin(^Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院,430073

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2022年第2期527-548,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(19ZDA061);高等学校学科创新引智基地(B21038);国家自科基金面上项目(71771217)的资助。

摘　　要：本文利用2011—2018年我国A股市场内部人交易数据,研究“国家队”持股这一典型的政府干预行为对内部人交易的影响。结果表明,“国家队”进入后,内部人交易的超额收益显著提高;内部人基于信息优势的策略性交易是“国家队”持股影响其交易收益的主要原因,“国家队”持股对内部人收益的影响在信息环境较差的公司中更强。进一步分析发现,“国家队”持股同时推动了行业和公司层面的股价上涨,显著提高了内部人交易的成功率和获利水平。Using 2011-2018 Chinese A-share market insiders’ trading data, we investigate how Chinese government’s intervention via direct stock trading affects the trading of firm insiders. We find that interventions by the national team significantly increase insiders’ trading return. Strategic trading of insiders based on information advantage is the main mechanism of the effect and the impact is stronger for firms with worse information environment. Further study indicates that the national team shareholdings can have a beneficial effect on stock prices at both firm level and industry level, and significantly increase the trading success rate and total profit of insiders.

关 键 词：内部人交易 “国家队”持股 策略性交易 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] D630[政治法律—政治学]