逻辑行为主义的心灵解释及其困难  

The Logical Behavioristic Explanation of Mind and Its Difficulties

作　　者：欧阳文川 OUYANG Wenchuan

机构地区：[1]新疆师范大学政法学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830017

出　　处：《北京行政学院学报》2022年第3期113-119,共7页Journal of Beijing administration institute

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“《福乐智慧》中伦理思想与中原传统伦理思想的整合研究”(18BZX101)。

摘　　要：逻辑行为主义通过分析心理概念在日常生活中的实际意义,进而将心理及其同源概念还原为“物理—行为”陈述来解决笛卡尔主义的身心关系困难。对其进行评价,一方面在于审视这种认识论层面的还原是否使得心灵状态在没有丧失其原有日常意义的前提下又获得了交互认知的特性;另一方面在于反思这种还原本身是否可能。事实上,逻辑行为主义对行为及其倾向的分析始终受到“社会文化”和“生物类型”背景的限制,且存在分析的不确定性、“可废除性蕴含”,以及无法解释“感受性质”等难以克服的困难。Logical behaviorism reduces the mind and its homologous concepts to the physical-behavioral state⁃ments to solve Cartesian difficulties in the relation between mind and body by analyzing the actual meaning of psychological concepts in daily life.To evaluate it lies in,on the one hand,examining whether this epistemo⁃logical reductionism enables the state of mind to acquire the characteristics of interactive cognition without los⁃ing its original significance of daily-life,and,on the other hand,reflecting on whether the reduction itself is possible.In fact,the logical behavioristic analysis of behavior and its tendency is always limited by the back⁃ground of“social culture”and“biological type”,and there are some insurmountable difficulties such as the un⁃certainty of analysis,“defeasible entailment”,and the inability to explain“qualia”.

关 键 词：行为主义 认识论 心灵状态 行为倾向 

分 类 号：B561[哲学宗教—外国哲学]