情绪能影响农业保险欺诈行为吗?——基于审计博弈的研究视角  

Do Sentiments Influence Agricultural Insurance Fraud?--Research from the Perspective of Audit Game

作　　者：罗琰 许莉[3] LUO Yan;XU Li(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 211815,China;Key Laboratory of Financial Engineering,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 2011815,China;School of Government Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,江苏南京211815 [2]南京审计大学金融工程重点实验室,江苏南京211815 [3]南京审计大学政府审计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2022年第3期34-41,共8页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71971118);江苏省金融工程重点实验室开放课题(NSK2021-06);南京审计大学国家一流专业(投资学)建设项目(2021JG119);江苏省高校优势学科三期南京审计大学应用经济学(苏政办发〔2018〕87号)。

摘　　要：基于博弈理论,首先分析了农业保险欺诈风险及审计依据。其次,将参与人情绪因素嵌入博弈理论分析框架,获得了博弈双方欺诈或审计最优策略表达式,并进行相应的经济学解释。最后,从审计监督视角给出了反欺诈政策建议。结论显示,审计成本、情绪因素都对双方决策行为具有重要影响,审计效率越高,审计成本越低,农户情绪越悲观,则欺诈行为发生的可能性越小。Based on the game theory,this paper analyzes the risk and audit basis of agricultural insurance fraud firstly.Then,in the framework of the game theory with sentiment factor,the optimal expressions of fraud or audit strategies of both parties are obtained,and the corresponding economic explanation are also given.Finally,from the perspective of the audit supervision,anti-fraud policy suggestions are given.The results indicate audit cost and sentiment factor have significant influence for the decision behavior of both parties that the more efficient the audit,the lower the audit cost,the more pessimistic the farmers,the less possible fraud.

关 键 词：农业保险 反欺诈 情绪 审计博弈 

分 类 号：F841[经济管理—保险]