论普世性的平等观念与比较性的平等观念  

On two conceptions of equality:equality as universa-lity and equality as comparability

作　　者：陆鹏杰 Lu Pengjie(School of Philosohy,Renmin University,Beijing,100872)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《哲学评论》2021年第1期202-214,共13页Wuda Philosophical Review

基　　金：国家留学基金的资助。

摘　　要：阿玛蒂亚·森认为,当前所有经得起时间考验的社会规范理论,实际上都主张人们应当平等地拥有某些东西,这些理论在这个意义上都可以被看成是平等主义理论。对于森的这一著名论断,拉里·特姆金通过区分“平等”的三种不同含义而质疑。尽管特姆金的论证本身存在着缺陷,但通过修订特姆金所提出来的区分,我们可以看到,真正得到广泛认可的平等观念是一种普世性的观念,而不是一种比较性的观念。因此,森的这一论断确实是难以成立的。Amartya Sen claims that every normative theory of social arrangement that has stood the test of time demands equality of something.According to Sen,all of these theories can be regarded as egalitarianism.But Larry Temkin challenged Sen’s view by distinguishing three conceptions of equality.In this paper,I argue that Temkin’s distinctions and arguments are flawed.However,by revising the distinctions proposed by Temkin,I also argue that the widely recognized conception of equality is a universal conception rather than a comparative conception.Therefore,Sen’s view is indeed a mistake.

关 键 词：平等主义 自由至上主义 效益主义 比较性原则 分配正义 

分 类 号：B82-051[哲学宗教—伦理学]