对斯特普信念自由论证的两个反驳--基于信念意志主义与认知责任  

Two Objections for Doxastic Freedom of Steup--Based on Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Responsibility

作　　者：尹孟杰 Yin Mengjie(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan,430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院

出　　处：《哲学评论》2021年第1期263-279,共17页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：信念自由问题是当代信念伦理学的主要议题之一,信念自由是认知责任的必要条件。哲学家马蒂亚斯·斯特普(Matthias Steup)在相容论的前提下,认为我们绝大多数的信念态度都是自由的,信念态度与行动在自由问题上具有对等性。本文通过厘清信念自由问题的理论背景,重构斯特普对信念自由的论证,并提出两个反驳,旨在表明信念自由论证需要对信念的产生过程进行更细致的把握,对行动理由与信念理由进行更合理的区分与更准确的运用。In contemporary epistemology,doxastic freedom has become a central issue.In the related debates,it has commonly been assumed that if our doxastic attitudes are free,then we own some epistemic responsibilities.According to compatibilism,Matthias Steup thinks that the thesis of equal doxastic freedom is true,which means that if our actions are mostly free,then our doxastic attitudes are mostly free.This paper begins by giving a brief overview of the theoretical background of doxastic freedom.It will then go on to reconstruct Steup’s argument for doxastic freedom and give two objections for Steup.Also,this paper aims to make a sense that the argument of doxastic freedom needs something more specific about belief-formation,and we should distinguish or make use of the concept of action’s reason and the concept of belief’s reason more accurately.

关 键 词：信念自由 信念态度 认知责任 意志主义 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]