母、子公司间的关联交易与利益输送  

Related Party Transactions and Tunneling&Propping between Parent and Subsidiary Companies

作　　者：龚新颍 黄晓波[1] GONG Xinying;HUANG Xiaobo(Business School, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院,武汉430062

出　　处：《河南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第3期62-69,共8页Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology(Social science)

基　　金：2018年度湖北社科基金项目(HBSK2018041)。

摘　　要：以2008—2019年全部A股上市公司为样本,研究母、子公司间的关联交易与利益输送。结果发现,大股东会通过母、子公司关联交易进行输入和输出两种类型的利益输送;母、子公司关联交易与利益输送程度呈显著正相关。进一步的研究表明:产品市场竞争以及合理的独立董事比例可以有效解决利益输送问题;过高的高管薪酬会加剧上市公司利益输送。因此,应强化市场竞争,适当提高独立董事比例,制定合理的高管薪酬政策,以便抑制母、子公司间的关联交易与利益输送。Taking all A-share listed companies in 2008-2019 as a sample,the paper analyzes the relationship between related party transactions and tunneling&propping between parent and subsidiary companies.We found that listed companies will be tunneling&propping by the major shareholders through the parent and subsidiary related party transactions.The degree of related party transactions and benefit transmission of parent and subsidiary companies is significantly positively correlated.Further research shows that product market competition and reasonable proportion of independent directors can effectively solve the problem of tunneling&propping.Excessive executive pay can exacerbate the transfer of benefits from listed companies.Therefore,we should strengthen market competition,appropriately increase the proportion of independent directors,and formulate reasonable executive compensation policies in order to restrain the related transactions and profit transmission between parent and subsidiary companies.

关 键 词：母子公司 关联交易 输入型利益输送 输出型利益输送 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]