区块链视角下中小企业关系型贷款博弈研究  

Analysis of SME Relationship Loan Game under Blockchain

作　　者：李值 周勇涛[1,2] Li Zhi;Zhou Yongtao(School ofBusiness,Hubei University,China;Research Center of Development Strategy and Policy for the Talent in Hubei,Wuhan 430062,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院 [2]湖北人才发展战略与政策研究中心,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《科技创业月刊》2022年第4期73-78,共6页Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology

摘　　要：构建中小企业关系型贷款博弈模型,从区块链视角探究中小企业融资,以及区块链技术在此过程中的作用机制。研究发现,传统银行融资模式不利于分离均衡的达成,该均衡的成立需要激励相容约束的达成。区块链技术通过提高企业信息透明度,使得激励相容约束条件更容易成立,从而有利于缓解融资约束。The development of blockchain technology provides new ideas for solving the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.Through the construction of the signal game model,the influence of the mechanism of blockchain technology in the process.The study found that the traditional bank financing mode is not conducive to the realization of separation and equilibrium,which needs the realization of incentive compatibility constraints.Blockchain technology improves the cost of forging soft information by enterprises,reducing the loss of income caused by information leakage,and making the incentive compatibility constraints conditions easier to set up,thus alleviating the financing constraints.

关 键 词：区块链 关系型贷款 中小企业 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理]