后期维特根斯坦论确定性与不确定性  

Wittgenstein’s Later View on Certainty and Uncertainty

作　　者：江怡 JIANG Yi(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学社会学学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《山西大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第3期1-9,共9页Journal of Shanxi University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“分析的西方哲学史研究”(19AZX013)。

摘　　要：《论确定性》是维特根斯坦晚年一部未完成的著作,对知识的确定性问题做出了系统思考,在当代哲学中引起了广泛深入讨论,但在各种不同视野中也带来了许多误解。这里试图根据全书的四部分内容,提出一种温和的解释,即维特根斯坦是把确定性与怀疑相对立,而不是与不确定性相对立,认为确定性表明了不可怀疑,这与基本经验事实有关,而与我们的知识和信念无关,唯有知识和信念才会存在不确定的问题。不确定性不是维特根斯坦想要拒绝的东西,而是他试图在某些信念中安定下来的东西。他承认知识的不确定性,并建议在不确定性中寻找确定性。这种意义上的不确定性,在我们的语言游戏中被实例化。通过与实用主义、克尔凯郭尔以及当代神经科学的比较分析,可以更加清楚地看到,维特根斯坦关于确定性和不确定性的思想,并不会因为它们之间的相似性而改变。On Certainty is Wittgenstein’s unfinished writing in his later years,which focuses systematically on the problem of certainty of knowledge.It has been widely discussed in contemporary philosophy with many misunderstandings in different fields.This paper tries to offer a moderate interpretation of the book according to its four parts,which includes Wittgenstein’s contrast of certainty with doubt rather than uncertainty,a claim that certainty is involved with indubitability,which is related to fundamental empirical facts but not to our knowledge and belief,and that only knowledge and belief are involved with uncertainty.The paper will argue that uncertainty is not what Wittgenstein tried to reject,but what he attempted to settle down in some beliefs.He admitted the uncertainty of knowledge and suggested to find out certainty from the uncertainty which is substantiated in our language games.It will be clear that Wittgenstein would not change his ideas of certainty and uncertainty even in comparison with pragmatists,Kierkegaard and neuroscientists on their similarities.

关 键 词：确定性 不确定性 知识 信念 语言游戏 

分 类 号：B561.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]