基于进化博弈论的产业创新网络中非核心企业演化机制研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Non-core Enterprises in the Industrial Innovation Network Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：于东平[1] 张慧 胡鉴 张俊婕 Yu Dongping;Zhang Hui;Hu Jian;Zhang Junjie(International Business School,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China)

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学国际工商学院,昆明650221

出　　处：《技术经济》2022年第5期52-62,共11页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区项目“产业创新网络中非核心企业逆向创新演化机理研究”(71764033)。

摘　　要：解密产业创新网络中非核心企业的生存之道,是诸多合作创新弱势群体的迫切需求。为此,基于进化博弈理论,构建出产业创新网络中非核心企业与核心企业之间的博弈模型,并借助VensimPLE软件对其进化过程进行仿真模拟,挖掘出产业创新网络中非核心企业演化路径。研究结果表明:①选择不同于彼此的创新策略,是产业创新网络中非核心企业与核心企业进化博弈的稳定策略;②各创新主体选择创新策略的初始概率,将直接决定产业创新网络进化博弈结果;③创新收益、创新成本及创新冲突收益损失的变动,会显著干扰非核心企业适应性创新策略的选择。It is an urgent need for many weak groups of cooperative innovation to decipher the way of survival of non‐core enterprises in the industrial innovation network.Therefore,a game model between core and non‐core enterprises in the industrial innovation network was built based on the evolutionary came theory,and then the evolution process was simulated by using Vensim PLE software to discover the evolution path of non‐core enterprises in the industrial innovation network.It is found that choosing an innovation strategy which is different from the one of core enterprises,is the evolutionary stable strategy for non‐core enterprises in the industrial innovation network.The initial probability for each innovation subject to choose a certain innovation strategy directly determines the evolutionary result of industrial innovation network.The change of innovation revenue,innovation cost and innovation conflict revenue loss,significantly influences the decision for non‐core enterprises to choose the adaptive innovation strategy.

关 键 词：进化博弈论 产业创新网络 非核心企业 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]