参考价格影响下的两阶段回报型众筹定价策略研究  

Research on Two-stage Reward Based Crowdfunding Pricing Strategies Considering the Reference Price Effect

作　　者：凌六一[1] 夏宇 徐煜 Ling Liuyi;Xia Yu;Xu Yu(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥230026

出　　处：《技术经济》2022年第5期176-188,共13页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家科学自然基金“大数据环境下的评价理论、方法和应用”(71631006)。

摘　　要：在众筹发起过程中,策略型消费者将对比众筹价格与零售价格,选择最优购买时机。基于此背景,构建了参考价格效应影响下的两阶段众筹定价模型,设计了众筹发起人的两阶段动态定价策略。发起人根据消费者的耐心程度和参考价格效应强度,选择是否公布零售价格,以及溢价或降价销售。利用理性预期均衡理论和逆向归纳法,得到了发起人与消费者博弈的均衡价格和最优发起策略。结论表明,发起人的策略选择并非单一的,同时受到消费者耐心程度和参考价格效应强度的影响。为众筹发起人的两阶段价格决策提供了理论参考和管理学建议。In the process of launching a crowdfunding project,strategic consumers will compare the crowdfunding price with the retail price to select the optimal time to purchase.Based on this background,a two‐stage crowdfunding pricing model under the influence of reference price effect was constructed,and the two‐stage dynamic pricing strategy of crowdfunding sponsors was designed.According to the degree of patience of consumers and the strength of the reference price effect,the promoters choose whether to publish the retail price,and sell at a higher or lower price during the second period.By using rational expectation equilibrium theory and backward induction method,the equilibrium price and optimal initiating strategy of the game were obtained.The results show that the sponsor’s strategy choice is not single,and it is affected by the patience of consumers and the strength of the reference price effect.The research conclusions provide theoretical reference and management suggestions for crowdfunding sponsors to make decisions on crowdfunding and retail price.

关 键 词：回报型众筹 参考价格效应 策略型消费者 产品定价 价格披露策略 

分 类 号：F713.55[经济管理—市场营销]