产品质量监管下电商平台与直播商家博弈演化分析  

Game Evolution Analysis Between E-commerce Platforms and Livestreaming Business under Supervision of Product Quality

作　　者：何艳宾 吴桥[2] 任春艳 HE Yanbin;WU Qiao;REN Chunyan(Zhejiang Wanli University,Ningbo Zhejiang 315100)

机构地区：[1]浙江万里学院物流与电子商务学院,浙江宁波315100 [2]浙江万里学院,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《浙江万里学院学报》2022年第4期1-7,共7页Journal of Zhejiang Wanli University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL046)。

摘　　要：通过构建电商平台与直播商家的收益矩阵,分析两者的博弈演化过程,得到电商平台和直播商家在不同条件下的稳定策略,并通过数值仿真来分析相关参数变化对稳定策略的影响。研究结果表明:监管强度的增大会使直播商家向质检服务策略演化;平台检测概率的增大,会使平台向强监管策略演化,直播商家向质检服务策略演化;直播商家自行选品时选品质量好的概率增大,会使直播商家向自行选品策略演化。By constructing the revenue matrix of the e-commerce platform and the livestreaming business,and analyzing the game evolution process of the two,the stability strategy of the e-commerce platform and the livestreaming business under different conditions was obtained,and the influence of related parameter changes on the stability strategy was analyzed through numerical simulation.The results showed that with the increase of supervision intensity,livestreaming business would evolve into quality inspection service strategy.With the increase of platform detection probability,the platform would evolve to strong supervision strategy,and the livestreamers would evolve to quality inspection service strategy.However,when the livestreamers chose products by themselves,the probability of choosing good quality products increased,which would make the livestreaming business tend to self-selection strategy.

关 键 词：电商平台 直播商家 质量监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]