资格、应得还是权利?——评诺奇克的资格正义  

Comments on Nozick’s Entitlement Justice:Entitlement,Desert,or Right?

作　　者：王立 Wang Li

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《社会科学战线》2022年第3期26-34,281,共10页Social Science Front

基　　金：中国人民大学“双一流”跨学科重大创新规划平台——国家治理现代化与应用伦理跨学科交叉平台项目。

摘　　要：诺奇克的资格正义在当代正义理论中占据重要位置。资格正义同分配正义相对,而资格正义的“反模式化”立场使所有的分配正义理论都面临干涉人们自由的合法性指控。资格正义令人耳目一新,然而,资格正义在诺奇克的理论建构中充满着复杂的概念纠缠:诺奇克有时候将资格与权利和应得概念同等使用,有时候又清晰区别。厘清其中的意义分殊,对于理解诺奇克资格正义的真实内涵、理论地位和作用都有着极为重要的意义。Nozick’s theory of entitlement justice occupies an important position in contemporary justice theory.Entitlement justice is the opposite of distributive justice,and the anti-patterning position of entitlement justice makes all theories of distributive justice face the accusation of interfering with people’s freedom as a legitimacy concern.Entitlement justice is novel.However,there are complicated conceptual entanglements in Nozick’s theoretical construction:Sometimes he uses the concept of entitlement,right and deserve indiscriminately,while distinguishing them clearly in other occasions.Thus,this paper argues that it is important to clarify the difference of meanings so as to understand the true connotation,theoretical status and functions of Nozick’s entitlement justice.

关 键 词：权利 资格 应得 分配正义 持有正义 

分 类 号：B712[哲学宗教—外国哲学]