国有资本参股何以影响民营企业现金持有?——基于合作优势和竞争制衡的双重视角  

How does the State-Owned Capital Shareholder Affect the Cash Holding of PrivateEnterprises?Based on the Dual Perspective of “Cooperative Advantages” and “Competitive Balances”

作　　者：曾敏 李常青[2] 李宇坤 ZENG Min;LI Chang-qing;LI Yu-kun(National Academy of Economic Strategy,CASS,Beijing,100006,China;School of Management,Xiamen University,Fujian,361005,China;International Business School,Shanxi Nornal University,Xi'an,Shanxi,710119,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院财经战略研究院,北京100006 [2]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005 [3]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710119

出　　处：《经济管理》2022年第4期134-152,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目“中国制度和文化背景下公司财务理论与实践研究”(71790601)。

摘　　要：基于“合作优势”和“竞争制衡”的双重视角,结合现金持有的“交易需求”“竞争效应”和“代理问题”假说,本文探讨了国有资本参股对于民营企业现金持有的影响。实证检验发现,国有资本参股可以显著提升民营企业的现金持有水平,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。机制分析发现,国有资本参股可以扩大民营企业的债务融资规模,进而使得后者有能力更多地增持现金以提升市场竞争力;国有资本参股可以缓解民营企业的“大股东-小股东”代理问题,抑制后者过度投资所造成的现金无谓耗散,继而增加现金持有水平。进一步研究发现,国有资本参股对现金持有的提升效应在处于竞争劣势的企业中更加显著,投资类股东参股对企业现金持有的提升作用更加显著,国有资本参股提升了企业的现金持有价值。本文拓展深化了股权结构领域的研究,丰富完善了“双向混改”的理论和对策研究,也印证了现金持有理论随着金融市场以及产品市场的发展在不断更新,新的理论具有更强的解释力。Based on dual perspectives of “cooperative advantages”and “competitive balances”as well as the classical theory of cash holding,this study proposes the competing hypotheses to explore how the state-owned capital shareholder affects the cash holding of private enterprises with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019.The research finds that state-owned capital shareholder can significantly enhance the cash holding of private enterprises.The conclusion still holds after a series of robustness test.The specific mechanism is that the state-owned capital shareholder expands the debt financing scale of private enterprises so that the latter have the ability to increase cash holding to enhance market competitiveness;In addition,the state-owned capital shareholder also alleviates the agency problem of “principal-principal” in private enterprises,restrains the unnecessary dissipation of cash caused by the over-investment,and thus increases the cash holdings.This means that the influence of state-owned capital shareholder on private enterprises not only realizes the synergistic effect of “cooperative advantages”,but also realizes the governance effect of “competitive balances”.Further research shows that the effect of state-owned capital shareholder on cash holdings is more significant in enterprises at a competitive disadvantage,which verifies the “competition effect”hypothesis.In addition,compared with industrial shareholders,investment shareholders play a more significant role in enhancing corporate cash holding.This conclusion is consistent with the theory that professional investment institutions have the ability to improve the corporate governance of shareholding enterprises and to access more capital resources.It also provides theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the reform of state-owned capital authorized management system.Finally,state-owned capital shareholder enhances firm value by increasing cash holdings.This shows that state-owned capital’s participation in private

关 键 词：现金持有 混合所有制改革 反向混改 国有资本 异质性股东 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]