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作 者:张云丰[1,2] 尚钱龙 龚本刚[1] 王勇[2] Zhang Yunfeng;Shang Qianlong;Gong Bengang;Wang Yong(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030
出 处:《系统工程学报》2022年第2期242-262,共21页Journal of Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071002);安徽省哲学社科规划基金资助项目(AHSKQ2018D09);安徽省高校自然科学研究资助项目(KJ2018A0101);安徽工程大学中青年拔尖人才培养计划资助项目(S022019008)。
摘 要:考虑由制造商、运输商及零售商组成的三级供应链在实施碳标签制度下的定价与碳减排决策问题.构建Stackberg博弈模型来分析供应链成员企业在无合作、单领域合作及双领域合作三种决策模式下的定价与碳减排最优策略组合,并讨论消费者环境意识水平对供应链定价与碳减排的影响.结果表明,双领域合作决策模式在经济效益(供应链系统利润)、社会效益(市场需求和产品定价)及环境效益(碳减排量)方面明显优于其它两种决策模式.为此,引入常相对风险规避型效用函数与Nash讨价还价理论来设计供应链协调契约,推导供应链成员企业参与协调的必要条件,合理分配双领域合作决策模式下的利润增量,实现三级供应链的完美协调.The article studies the pricing and carbon emission reduction decision-making of the three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer,a transporter and a retailer under the implementation of carbon labeling system.A Stackberg game model is established to analyze the optimal strategy combinations of pricing and carbon emission reduction of supply chain member enterprises under three modes of noncooperation,single-domain cooperation and dual-domain cooperation.The paper discussed the impact of consumers’environmental awareness level on the pricing and carbon emission reduction of supply chain.The results show that the double-domain cooperative decision-making model is obviously superior to the other two models in terms of economic benefit(profit of supply chain system),social benefit(market demand and product pricing)and environmental benefit(carbon emission reduction).Therefore,the utility function of constant relative risk aversion and Nash bargaining theory are introduced to design the coordination contract of supply chain.The necessary conditions for member enterprises to participate in the coordination are derived.The profit increment under the double-domain cooperation mode is reasonably distributed to realize the perfect coordination.
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