高管股权激励与企业风险承担——基于内部控制质量的调节效应  

Executive Equity Incentive and Enterprise Risk Taking——Moderating Effect based on the Ouality of Internal Control

作　　者：王竞萱 胡旭微[1] WANG Jing-xuan;HU Xu-wei

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《生产力研究》2022年第5期1-6,F0003,共7页Productivity Research

摘　　要：高管的风险选择对一个企业的经营与发展起到了重要作用。对企业而言,风险承担不仅代表了企业对风险的态度,还是企业未来能否取得盈利的重要前提。文章选取我国沪深A股上市公司2016—2020年的数据为研究样本,运用理论结合实证的方法,探讨了高管股权激励对企业风险承担的影响,以及内部控制质量对二者关系的调节。研究发现,高管股权激励对企业风险承担产生了正向效应,而内部控制质量能够负向调节高管股权激励对企业风险承担的正向作用。文章的研究丰富和拓展了企业风险承担的相关问题,同时也为企业决策提供了经验证据,提醒企业在日常治理的过程中要加强对内部控制体系的建设,在实施高管股权激励的同时也要把握好企业的风险承担水平。The risk selection of executives plays an important role in the operation and development of an enterprise.For enterprises,risk taking not only represents the attitude of the enterprise to risk,but also an important premise of whether the enterprise can make profits in the future.This paper selects the data of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020 as the research sample,and uses the theoretical and empirical methods to discuss the impact of executive equity incentives on enterprise risk taking,and the adjustment of the relationship between the two by the quality of internal control.The study found that executive equity incentives have a positive effect on enterprise risk taking,while the quality of internal control can negatively moderate the positive effect of executive equity incentives on enterprise risk taking.

关 键 词：高管股权激励 内部控制质量 企业风险承担 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]