员工持股计划的公司治理效应研究--基于股价大幅下跌风险的视角  

Research on the Corporate Governance Effect of Employee Stock Ownership Plan--From the Perspective of the Risk of Sharp Decline in Share Price

作　　者：翟淑萍 毛文霞 刘梦晨 ZHAI Shu-ping;MAO Wen-xia;LIU Meng-chen

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学会计学院,天津300222

出　　处：《金融论坛》2022年第6期45-54,共10页Finance Forum

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71972140、71872121)。

摘　　要：本文采用PSM-DID方法检验员工持股计划对股价大幅下跌风险的影响。研究发现:实施员工持股计划能显著降低企业股价大幅下跌风险。其作用机理为:员工持股计划通过提升企业信息透明度、缓解企业双重委托代理成本,减少坏消息的产生和隐藏,进而降低股价大幅下跌风险。当员工认购股票的资金来源于自有资金,认购的股票为非公开发行,以及在劳动密集度更高的企业,实施员工持股计划对股价大幅下跌风险的抑制作用更强。This paper uses PSM-DID method to test the impact of employee stock ownership plan on the risk of sharp decline in share price.The result shows that the implementation of employee stock ownership plan can significantly reduce the risk of sharp decline in enterprise share price.Its mechanism is as follows:the employee stock ownership plan improves the transparency of enterprise information and alleviates the dual principal-agent cost of enterprises,so as to reduce the generation and concealment of bad news,and thus reduces the risk of sharp decline in share price.This inhibitory effect is even stronger if employees subscribe for shares from their own funds,the subscribed shares are non-public offerings,and in enterprises with higher labor intensity.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 股价大幅下跌风险 信息透明度 双重委托代理 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51