考虑消费者公平偏好的竞争供应链歧视定价研究  

Behavior-based Pricing in Two Competitive Supply Chains Considering Peer-induced Consumer Fairness Preference

作　　者：刘静[1] 聂佳佳[1] 袁红平 LIU Jing;NIE Jia-jia;YUAN Hong-ping(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;School of Management,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]广州大学工商管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2022年第5期204-215,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573216,71672153);四川省社会科学研究规划重大项目(SC17ZD09)。

摘　　要：考虑消费者存在公平偏好且两个制造商分别通过各自的零售商销售相似产品的竞争供应链,并构建三种情形下的博弈论模型,研究了不同的供应链成员采用基于消费者历史购买行为的歧视定价(BBP)策略对制造商和零售商利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究发现:与不采用BBP策略相比,1)仅零售商采用BBP策略会降低制造商利润,但是当消费者公平偏好较大时,仅零售商采用BBP策略会增加零售商利润;2)当制造商和零售商均采用BBP策略会同时增加制造商和零售商的利润;3)仅零售商使用BBP策略会减小消费者剩余,然而制造商和零售商均使用BBP策略会增加消费者剩余;4)仅零售商采用BBP策略会降低社会福利,当制造商也采用BBP策略会进一步降低社会福利。With the advancement of information technology, retailers often use data automatic collection devices to track and store information about consumers’ purchase history data, and thus new consumers and past consumers can be recognized. Not surprisingly, retailers often adopt the behavior-based pricing(BBP) strategy, i.e., to charge a different price for new consumers and past consumers. Additionally, it is observed that retailers sometimes choose to share consumers’ purchase history data with manufacturers, and thus both manufacturers and retailers can adopt BBP strategy. However, the adoption of BBP strategy has raised concerns about peer-induced fairness. That is, consumers will feel unfair if the price they purchase is higher than other consumers, which will consequently affect consumers’ purchase willingness. Following this logic, the question naturally comes out: when consumers are concerned about peer-induced fairness, is there any difference in different supply chain members’ adoption of BBP? And further, what is the difference?To answer these questions, a channel setting where two manufacturers sell similar products through their respective retailers and consumers with peer-induced preferences is considered in this study. Firstly, since manufacturers can adopt BBP only when retailers choose to share consumers’ purchase history data, three models based on game theory are considered in this paper. The first one is that neither retailers nor manufacturers adopt BBP(i.e., model N), the second one is that retailers will not share consumers’ purchase history data with manufacturers and thus only retailers adopt BBP(i.e., model R), and the third one is that retailers share consumer’s purchase history, and both retailers and manufacturers adopt BBP(i.e., model B). Secondly, by comparing three models, the impacts of different supply chain members’ adoption of BBP on manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare with the consideration of consumers’ peer-induced fairn

关 键 词：消费者公平偏好 歧视定价 竞争供应链 博弈论 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]