参考价格效应对双渠道中零售商信息分享策略的影响  

Demand Information Sharing in the Dual-channel Supply Chain with Reference Price Effect

作　　者：石纯来 廖治通 蒋玉石[2] Shi Chunlai;Liao Zhitong;Jiang Yushi(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710126;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《管理评论》2022年第4期153-161,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71440016,71672153);国家社会科学基金项目(19FGLB023);中国博士后科学基金项目(2018M631126)。

摘　　要：以未考虑和考虑参考价格效应为模型,探讨参考价格效应对双渠道供应链中零售商信息分享策略的影响。研究发现:未考虑参考价格效应时,零售商不与制造商分享其需求信息。考虑参考价格效应时,零售商是否与制造商分享需求信息取决于零售渠道和直销渠道间的竞争强度以及参考价格效应系数。若渠道间竞争较弱,当参考价格效应系数较小时,零售商不与制造商分享需求信息;当参考价格效应系数较大时,零售商与制造商分享需求信息。若渠道间竞争激烈,零售商总是不与制造商分享其需求信息。此外,在未考虑参考价格效应和考虑参考价格效应两种情形中,零售商与制造商分享需求信息均增加制造商利润。The non-reference price effect model is used as the benchmark model to explore the impact of the reference price effect on the choice of retailer information sharing strategies in the dual-channel supply chain.The study finds that retailer has no incentives to share demand information with manufacturers when the reference price effect is not considered,which is consistent with the traditional wisdoms.When the reference price effect is considered,the retailer may share demand information with the manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain.In particular,if the competition between the channels is weak and the reference price effect is large,the retailer has an incentive to share demand information with the manufacturer;otherwise,the retailer still has no incentive to share demand information with the manufacturer.In addition,no matter whether the reference price effect is considered or not,the profit of the manufacturer increases as soon as it obtains demand information from the retailer.

关 键 词：参考价格效应 信息分享 双渠道供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]