麻疹疫苗接种博弈的动力学模型及分析  

Dynamic Model and Analysis of Measles Vaccination Game

作　　者：葛静文 王稳地[1] GE Jingwen;WANG Wendi(School of Mathematics and Statistics, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China)

机构地区：[1]西南大学数学与统计学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《西南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第7期44-48,共5页Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(12071381).

摘　　要：建立麻疹疫苗接种博弈模型,在模型中引入分布时滞来反映自愿接种个体的决策具有信息依赖性.分析了系统平衡点的存在性及稳定性态,证明了Hopf分支的存在性,研究结果表明:当个体采纳的信息区间长度超过临界阈值时,其决策可能会出现反复变化的情况,并造成疾病的再次爆发.A game model of measles vaccination has been established,in which the distributed time delay has been introduced to reflect the information dependence of the decision of the individual willing to be vaccinated.The existence and stability of equilibrium points of the system have been analyzed,and the existence of Hopf bifurcation been proved.The result shows that,when the length of the information interval adopted by an individual exceeds the critical threshold,its decision may change repeatedly,and the disease may break out again.

关 键 词：麻疹 疫苗接种 博弈论 信息依赖 分布时滞 

分 类 号：O175[理学—数学]