碳价和现货电价相互作用机理研究——基于特定场景模拟分析  

Interaction mechanism of carbon price and spot power price

作　　者：郭慧东 张晶杰[2] 魏子杰 张念武 

机构地区：[1]龙源(北京)碳资产管理技术有限公司 [2]中国电力企业联合会

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2022年第2期63-68,共6页Price:Theory & Practice

摘　　要：为分析全国碳市场碳价和现货电价相互作用机理,本文建立市场环境下火电厂利润模型,以某省电力系统为例,讨论碳价与现货电价协同的碳减排效果。研究认为:在特定的电力供需场景中,在理性充分竞争现货电力市场环境下,采用“可交易绩效标准”配额分配机制的碳市场,不但不会引起电价上涨,还可以在一定程度上降低现货市场出清电价;通过碳市场机制使包含碳排放成本的气电成本低于煤电成本,增加燃气发电的市场竞争力,进而由碳排放强度低的燃气发电代替燃煤发电,但实现此目标需要高碳价,此时的市场电价也会大幅上涨。因此,要在经济可承受范围内取得更大的减排成效,需要扩大碳市场的行业覆盖范围,挖掘全社会减排潜力;碳市场和电力市场协同可提高可再生能源发电装机占比和发电量占比,推动电力系统低碳转型。In order to analyze the interaction mechanism of carbon price and spot power price,this paper establishes a profit model of coal-fired power plants under the market environment,takes a provincial power system as the simulation object,and discusses the emission reduction achievement through carbon price and spot power price coordination.It is considered that in a specific power supply and demand scenario,under the rational and fully competitive spot electricity market environment,the ETS(emission trading system) with TPS(tradable performance standard) allowance allocation mechanism will not lead to power price rising,but also can reduce the spot market clearing power price to a certain extent;Under ETS,it is possible to reduce carbon emission through fuel switch from coal to nature gas,since the cost of gas power might be lower than coal power.However,the carbon price required to replace coal power by gas power through carbon market mechanism is too high to accept in China due to extremely tariff inflation;In order to achieve greater emission reduction results within the affordable cost,it is necessary to expand the industry coverage of carbon market and realize the full potential of every emission reduction resources in the whole society;the synergy of carbon market and power market can increase the proportion of renewable power generation and installed capacity,and promote the low-carbon transformation of power system.

关 键 词：碳价 现货市场 电价 碳市场 配额分配 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F426.61[经济管理—产业经济] F832.5