考虑不完全理性的行人-驾驶员博弈决策分析  

Consider the Decision Analysis of Pedestrian-Driver Game with Incomplete Rationality

作　　者：董晓琦 秦雅琴[1] 谢济铭 李秋谷 DONG Xiaoqi;QIN Yaqin;XIE Jiming;LI Qiugu(Faculty of Transportation Engineering,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650500,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学交通工程学院,云南昆明650500

出　　处：《昆明理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第3期138-147,共10页Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71861016);国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFB1600500)。

摘　　要：为描述行人过街通行时人车冲突博弈关系,从驾驶员和行人两个角度分析了无信号控制路段上驾驶员与行人之间的相互作用.首先,提出基于博弈论的人车冲突模型,在混合策略博弈模型中考虑有限理性、个体偏好等因素,遴选博弈者对自身时间效益的看重程度α_(i)、博弈者对对方的体谅程度β_(i)、博弈者对对方的不信任程度θ_(i),量化上述心理参数.然后,考虑博弈双方收益对对手的影响,建立行人、驾驶员过街时决策心理模型,形成“车让人”策略局.最后,对驾驶员和行人进行让行倾向调查,分析行人、驾驶员的让行意愿与上述心理因素之间的关系,并根据调查结果设置初始数值,进行数值模拟分析.结果表明:道路参与者对自身时间效益与对对方的体谅程度基本一致,但驾驶员在对行人的信任程度上普遍低于行人对驾驶员的信任程度.与以往的研究结果相反的是,驾驶员主动让行意愿大于行人让行意愿,大部分行人敢于优先过街,“车让人”政策对驾驶员-行人通行决策具有显著影响.依据结果,提出加强通行管制建议,规范驾驶员行为,增强行人对驾驶员让行的信任程度,减少交通冲突,提高道路通行效率.In order to describe the game relation of human-vehicle conflict when pedestrians cross the street,this paper explores the tendency of pedestrians and drivers to yield on the road section without signal control,and analyzes the interaction between drivers and pedestrians on the road section without signal control from the perspectives of drivers and pedestrians.First of all,the paper puts forward a model of car conflict based on behavioral game theory,in the mixed strategy game model,with consideration of factors such as bounded rationality,individual preference selection to punt on their own time to benefit the value degree α_(i),the game on the degree of understanding each other β_(i),the game’s distrust in the other θ_(i),quantitative describe the psychological parameters.Then,considering the influence of the benefits of both sides on the opponent,the decision-making psychological model of pedestrians and drivers when crossing the street is established to form the social optimal strategy board of“car letting people”.Finally,a survey was conducted on drivers and pedestrians’tendency to yield,and the relationship between pedestrians’and drivers’willingness to yield and the above psychological factors were analyzed.Initial values were set according to the survey results and numerical simulation analysis was conducted.The results show that road participants’understanding of their own time benefit is basically the same as that of each other,but drivers’trust in pedestrians is generally lower than pedestrians’trust in drivers.Contrary to previous research results,drivers’willingness to yield was greater than pedestrians’willingness to yield,and most pedestrians dared to cross the street first.It was found that the“vehicle yield”policy had a significant impact on driver-pedestrian traffic decisions.According to the results,suggestions are put forward to further strengthen traffic control,regulate drivers’behavior,enhance pedestrians’trust in drivers’giving up,reduce traffic conflict

关 键 词：交通工程 过街决策 行为博弈论 人车冲突 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]