官员视察与民营企业环保投入  

Official Inspection and the Environmental Investment of Private Enterprises: An Empirical Research based on CEPS

作　　者：何轩[1] 肖炜诚 HE Xuan;XIAO Wei-cheng(School of Economics&Trade,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510006,China)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学经济贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《经济管理》2022年第5期157-175,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目“企业家党代表身份对民营企业社会责任履行的影响机制研究——基于党组织和工会的调节效应”(21YJA6300026);广东省人文社会科学重点研究基地项目“执政党与私营企业政治互信机制对企业家精神配置的影响”(2018YS001);国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国家族企业与制度环境的共生演化:以企业家精神配置为视角的经验性研究”(71572051)。

摘　　要：十九届四中全会明确强调建立生态文明建设目标评价考核制度、严格落实企业主体责任和政府监管责任的重要性。在这一背景下,官员监督视察作为落实环保目标责任的常态化、制度化机制,是否以及如何引导民营企业承担环保主体责任?本文运用全国私营企业调查数据,剖析了中国情境中的官员视察影响民营企业环保投入的监督机制和声誉机制。研究发现:官员视察提高了民营企业环保投入。进一步分析表明,若政府环保压力越大,官员视察对环保投入的促进作用越强,验证了监督机制假说;官员视察通过声誉增益帮助民营企业获得银行贷款,且若企业获得银行贷款越多(即声誉激励越强)、地区重视声誉的文化氛围越浓厚,官员视察对环保投入的促进作用会越强,验证了声誉机制假说。上述结论表明,通过完善官员视察这一“亲”和“清”新型政商关系,既可提高政府环境规制实效、引导企业参与环境保护,亦能助推民营企业发展,实现生态文明建设与经济高质量发展的良性循环。The fourth plenary session of the 19 th CPC Central Committee clearly emphasized the importance of establishing an evaluation system for constructing of ecological civilization and strictly implementing the main responsibility of enterprises and government supervision.As an important economic subject, private enterprises are not only the key monitored object of pollution prevention and control but also an important carrier to promote economic greening through environmental supervision and governance.In this context, whether and how will the officials’ supervisory inspection, as a normalized and institutionalized mechanism for implementing the environmental protection targets, guide private enterprises to undertake the environmental protection responsibility? Previous studies have investigated the interaction between environmental regulation and enterprise environmental protection behavior based on the government governance system with Chinese characteristics, indicating that government’s governance has a crucial impact on the effect of environmental regulation policy and enterprise environmental protection behavior.However, there is a logical fault between the change in regional political structure and the adjustment of micro-level enterprise behavior.What needs to be further studied is how do the environmental protection intentions of local governments, especially the officials, influence the environmental protection behaviors of private enterprises and what are the mechanisms involved, which is of great importance to the research on the antecedents of enterprises’ environmental protection behavior under the government governance system with Chinese characteristics and to guide China’s environmental protection practice.This paper analyzes the supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism of official inspection affecting the environmental protection investment of private enterprises in China.The supervision mechanism shows that official inspection reduces the environmental information asymmetry between o

关 键 词：环保督察 环保目标责任制 企业环保投入 生态文明建设 新型政商关系 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]